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Executive Summary
At its independence in 1964, Zambia, a landlocked 
country in Southern Africa, was perceived to have 
a bright future. The country was endowed with vast 
natural resources, including favorable agroeco- 
logical conditions and large copper deposits. Within 
two decades, however, the country descended into 
a macroeconomic crisis. Agriculture and rural 
incomes stagnated and industry was collapsing, 
leading to severe poverty and malnutrition. This 
case study examines how Zambia's different 
development strategies led first to a macro- 
economic crisis in the 1980s and then to economic 
recovery in the late 1990s. More specifically, it 
focuses on the interplay between macroeconomic 
and sectoral policies and draws attention to how 
policies and stakeholder interests at different levels 
of an economy must work synergistically if a 
development strategy is to be sustainable and 
achieve its objectives.
Zambia's government first adopted a strategy of 
state-directed industrialization. Bolstered by copper 
revenues and the political influence of urban 
dwellers, this strategy favored urban industry over 
agriculture and rural development. When world 
copper prices collapsed, however, the country 
plunged into macroeconomic crisis and the sectoral 
policies underlying state-directed industrialization 
became unsustainable. Driven by pressures from 
domestic political constituents and international 
donors, Zambia became a multiparty democracy in 
1991 and elected a government that favored a 
strategy of market-driven development. The coun­
try eventually achieved macroeconomic stability by 
curtailing sectoral investments and subsidies, but 
with mixed consequences for national welfare and 
agricultural producers.
Zambia has recently experienced a period of 
renewed growth and poverty reduction. Yet just as 
falling copper prices forced Zambia to undergo 
market-oriented reforms, the recent boom in world 
copper prices could provide incentives to return to 
a more interventionist development strategy. To 
implement such a strategy, however, the govern­
ment would have to raise taxes on foreign mining 
companies, which now own Zambia's previously 
state-owned mines. This case study focuses on 
trade-offs from raising mining taxes and possible 
implications for agriculture and the food system.
Given the current political environment and taking 
into account the mechanisms through which a 
change in world copper prices affects the agricul­
tural sector, your assignment is to advise Zambia's 
government on how it might use the revenues 
gained from increasing mining taxes to improve 
economic growth and reduce poverty.
Background
In 1981 Zambia, a landlocked country in Southern 
Africa, was reclassified by the World Bank from 
middle- to low-income status. The country had 
accumulated US$1.8 billion in external debt, and per 
capita incomes had collapsed from US$527 in the 
late 1960s to US$395 in the early 1980s [World 
Bank 2007], By the early 1990s the country's long 
descent into macroeconomic crisis compelled a 
change in government and widespread economic 
reforms. Nonetheless, contemporary Zambia 
remains a low-income country with per capita 
income of around US$300 and with 68 percent of 
the population living below the poverty line. As in 
many parts of Africa, poverty and malnutrition are 
particularly severe in rural areas, where 60 percent 
of the population resides, virtually all of whom 
depend on agriculture for their livelihoods.
Yet based on its natural resources, Zambia had the 
potential to achieve a very different outcome. The 
country is blessed with a variety of agroecological 
conditions providing opportunities to pursue a 
diverse array of agricultural activities. Maize is the 
dominant food crop in the country, although 
sorghum and millet are important in the drier 
southern provinces and cassava dominates in the 
north. Together, food crops and livestock make up 
most of the agricultural sector, although export 
crops, such as cotton and tobacco, are increasingly 
important. Owing to low population densities and 
poor road infrastructure, most smallholder farmers 
live in remote areas many miles from markets. Even 
farmers with better access to input markets tend to 
have low crop yields, partly owing to inadequate 
research and extension services. Irrigation is rare, 
and Zambia's rainfed agriculture suffers from 
repeated droughts, which result in chronic food 
insecurity.
Zambia's underinvestment in agriculture continues, 
and today less than 5 percent of public resources
are spent on the sector each year. As one of the 
world's largest exporters of copper, however, 
Zambia at one point possessed the resources to 
make long-term investments in the agricultural 
sector and the food system more broadly. How did 
a country with such agricultural potential find itself 
with a failing agricultural sector and a periodic 
dependence on food imports? Why did a country 
with considerable copper revenues become over­
whelmed by macroeconomic instability and bur­
geoning foreign debt? The answers to these 
questions lie in the development strategies adopted 
by Zambia at different times in its history and 
specifically in the interplay between macroeconomic 
and sectoral policies.
Policy Issues and Challenges
What Is ti Development Strategy?
Development strategies are the bundle of policies 
adopted by governments to achieve prioritized 
objectives, such as economic growth or poverty 
reduction. A strategy reflects a particular concept 
of the development process and is thus influenced 
by prevailing policy and theoretical beliefs. For 
example, "state-directed industrialization" and 
"market-driven development" are strategies moti­
vated by different development models. As seen in 
Figure I, a country's strategy and how it is imple­
mented also depend on exogenous factors, such as 
natural resource endowments and the political 
interests and power relations of different stake­
holders. The capacity of the state to design and 
implement policies also influences its choice of 
strategy.
The policies constituting a development strategy 
operate at different levels of the economy. At the 
macro-level are monetary and tax policies, which, 
among other things, help manage a country's 
money supply and revenues and are the main levers 
for influencing the level of inflation and public 
deficits. At the meso-level are sectoral and trade 
policies, which rely on policy instruments like tariff 
protection, price subsidies, and public investments 
to encourage specific sectors, such as agriculture, 
industry, health, and education. More micro-level 
policies, like food aid, are often directly targeted at 
specific population groups, such as rural and urban 
households. There is a symbiotic relationship 
among all three levels. Indeed, macroeconomic 
policies play a pivotal role in a development 
strategy because they determine the viability of
lower-level policies. At the same time, the financing 
of meso- and micro-level policies has implications 
for fiscal deficits and macroeconomic stability. As 
such, the policies at each level of the economy 
must work synergistically for a development 
strategy to be sustainable and its objectives realized.
Although the interaction of policies makes it diffi­
cult to attribute outcomes to specific policies, 
macroeconomic policies usually determine macro- 
economic stability and fiscal sustainability, whereas 
sectoral policies determine trade performance, 
production, and employment. It is also important 
to distinguish between economic and social out­
comes. Macroeconomic policies are often designed 
to achieve economic outcomes, such as controlling 
foreign exchange, whereas sectoral policies may 
target economic and social outcomes, such as 
improving rural incomes through agricultural 
growth. Above all, the capacity of the state to 
implement policies will determine all of these 
outcomes.
State-directed Industrialization and 
Macroeconomic Crisis, 1964-1990
Like many African countries during the 1960s and 
1970s, Zambia pursued a development strategy 
driven by large-scale urban-based industrialization 
and a vast degree of state intervention in the 
economy. For Africa as a whole, the impetus for 
this strategy, termed "urban bias," was threefold. 
First, there was a genuine belief among African 
governments that state-directed industrialization 
was the most effective means of achieving moderni­
zation. Indeed, this was the prevailing development 
paradigm of that period, widely espoused by both 
development economists and international institu­
tions [Helleiner 1986; Lofchie 1997], Second, in the 
quintessential political economy work on the 
subject, Bates [1981] observed that well-organized 
consumers and trade unions located in African 
cities posed greater threats to African leaders and 
the prevailing one-party political systems than more 
dispersed and remote smallholder agricultural 
producers. As such, African governments invested 
more heavily in urban areas, often leading to the 
decline and neglect of the agricultural sector. 
Third, many African countries are endowed with 
considerable mining resources that provided the 
revenues for financing investments in state indus­
tries at the expense of agriculture. For instance, 
copper revenues constituted 53 percent of Zambia's 
government budget in the decade after the country 
achieved independence in 1964 (Bratton 1994],
Figure 1: Strategics, Policies, and Outcomes
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Copper revenue, political concerns, and prevail­
ing policy beliefs all contributed to the indus­
trialization strategy pursued by the ruling United 
National Independence Party [UNIP], A major 
prong of this strategy was import-substitution- 
industrialization [ISI], which sheltered state-owned 
industries from international competition 
through protectionist trade policies. By limiting 
competition from foreign imports, ISI was 
expected to provide Zambia's "infant" industries 
with an opportunity to achieve global com­
petitiveness. High tariff barriers were erected 
against foreign imports, and Zambian industries 
relied on cheap raw materials to produce manu­
factured goods intended for export. Anticipated 
advantages of this approach included improved 
manufacturing capacity and increased employ­
ment opportunities in urban areas. Indeed, ISI 
contributed to the tremendous growth of state- 
owned industries, which accounted for three- 
quarters of the Zambian economy by 1990 
[McCulloch et al. 2000], The concentration of 
investment in roads and railroads in the middle 
of the country, where most of the copper mines 
and manufacturing industry were located, further 
bolstered the objectives of ISI.
Nevertheless, such trade and investment policies 
were detrimental to agriculture. In particular, ISI 
led to a disadvantageous shift in the terms-of- 
trade against agriculture, in which Zambia pos­
sessed a comparative advantage. Moreover, 
urban-biased public investment deprived rural 
regions of the infrastructure needed to transport 
agricultural goods to domestic and foreign 
markets. In fact, the share of the public budget 
allocated to agriculture declined from 7 percent 
in 1966-1970 to 3 percent in 1975-1980 [Bratton 
1994).
At the same time, the rapid expansion of the 
copper sector led to changes in the exchange 
rate that also hurt agriculture. The large revenues 
received by Zambia thanks to high copper prices 
raised the value of the country's currency, the 
kwacha. Although this overvaluation made 
foreign imports cheaper, it also undermined the 
export competitiveness of Zambia's non-mining 
sectors, especially agriculture. This phenomenon 
is generally referred to as "Dutch disease" and 
usually occurs when the exploitation of a natural 
resource leads to the overvaluation of a nation's 
currency and results in adverse terms of trade.
Other aspects of the government's industrializa­
tion strategy involved more direct interventions 
in the agricultural sector. Because agriculture was 
viewed as a food security sector rather than a 
growth sector, the government offered small­
holders subsidized inputs for maize production, 
the country's main food staple. As a result, maize 
was grown throughout the country, even in 
agroecological regions where it was poorly 
suited, and this approach thus stifled agricultural 
diversity. Furthermore, the compensation that 
smallholder farmers received for their output was 
rarely commensurate with domestic market 
prices. Farmers were implicitly taxed through 
panterritorial prices administered by the National 
Agricultural Marketing Board [NamBoard], which 
bought producers' maize output at a constant 
price despite local disparities in supply and 
demand. These policies enabled the government 
to keep food prices low, thereby subsidizing the 
consumption of urban residents [Bratton 1994; 
Pletcher 2000).
The policies that made up Zambia's industrializa­
tion strategy proved disastrous for agriculture 
and food production. Smallholders' purchasing 
power declined, and they faced an incentive to 
either reduce output or smuggle it to neighbor­
ing countries where they could receive higher 
prices. Jansen [1991) estimated that agricultural 
output was approximately 30 percent lower on 
average per year as the result of such policies. 
Consequently, the country could meet only 79 
percent of its food needs by 1980 [Bratton 1994), 
and there was large-scale migration out of rural 
areas, with the share of the rural population fall­
ing from 74 to 60 percent during 1965-1980 
(see Table I).
When world copper prices collapsed in the mid- 
1970s, the whole edifice upon which Zambia's 
industrialization strategy was built began to 
crumble. Without export revenues from copper, 
the government could not realistically afford to 
subsidize inefficient state enterprises or maintain 
subsidies on food and agricultural inputs. The 
government initially attempted to maintain its 
sectoral policies by adjusting its macroeconomic 
policies. For instance, the government devalued 
the kwacha in an attempt to curb import demand 
and reduce the country's widening trade deficit. 
To overcome what it believed to be a temporary 
terms-of-trade shock, the government borrowed
heavily on international capital markets, and 
foreign debt mounted rapidly. By 1983 debt per 
capita exceeded gross domestic product [GDP] 
per capita, and by 1991 the country was more 
than US$4 billion in debt. The government's 
eventual decision to counter the growing budget 
deficit by printing more money only exacerbated 
the situation, and by 1990 the inflation rate had 
risen to more than 100 percent. Zambia's 
attempted industrialization strategy had failed, 
and the country entered a severe macroeconomic 
crisis.
The combination of high inflation, rapid devalua­
tion, and burgeoning foreign debt hurt rural and 
urban populations alike. Devaluation meant that 
the currency declined in worth just as inflation 
was increasing the price of domestic goods, thus 
driving up the cost of living, especially for urban 
households whose consumption patterns are 
typically more import-intensive. At the same 
time, the labor market contracted and employers 
imposed wage freezes, so they were not adjusting 
their workers' incomes to meet the rising living 
costs. By the mid-1980s, these processes cumula­
tively resulted in a two-thirds decline in the pur­
chasing power of urban consumers and caused 
around 80 percent of rural households to strug­
gle to meet their basic consumption needs 
[Bratton 1994], Child mortality also increased 
dramatically, and the number of malnourished 
children ranged from one-third in the Eastern 
Province to two-thirds in the Northern Province 
[Bratton 1994], Moreover, a higher percentage of 
children under five years old were wasted or 
stunted than in 1970 [McCulloch et al. 2000], 
and the proportion of the total population con­
sidered undernourished had risen by 21 percent 
since the country had achieved independence 
[FAO 2007],
Because of the pronounced deterioration in key 
social indicators, the ballooning budget deficit, 
and rising external debt, Zambia negotiated a 
series of structural adjustment programs [SAPs] 
with the International Monetary Fund [IMF], 
SAPs usually require governments to adopt a 
package of interconnected reforms, such as 
macroeconomic stabilization, trade liberalization, 
and privatization. Stabilization involves both cor­
recting exchange rate distortions and reducing 
public spending to curtail inflation and reduce 
budget deficits. Stabilization can also reverse 
adverse terms of trade by ensuring that the 
exchange rate is not overvalued. Likewise, a
liberal trade policy reduces tariffs against foreign 
imports and halts government funding of non­
competitive industries. Simultaneously, privatiza­
tion requires that the government diminish its 
support of poorly performing state-owned 
enterprises and reduce the number of public 
sector employees.
The UNIP government's resistance to fully 
implementing these economic policies, however, 
highlights their politically contentious nature. 
The clearest example occurred in 1986 when the 
government attempted to rescind subsidies on 
maize meal, which is Zambia's main staple, in 
order to pursue fiscal austerity. At the time, the 
subsidy was more than 70 percent of the retail 
price of maize [Jansen 1991], Urban consumers, 
who resented facing higher prices for a food 
staple when their incomes were already being 
eroded by inflation, responded with riots 
[Grindle 1996]. Afraid to alienate its urban con­
stituents, the UNIP government under President 
Kenneth Kaunda backed away from the subsidy 
removals.
UNI P's halting reforms not only undermined the 
confidence of international donors but also em­
boldened the country's trade unions. Well- 
organized and aggrieved by the loss of their 
purchasing power, these unions, along with civil 
society and the private sector, formed a coalition 
and gave birth to a cohesive opposition party, 
known as the Movement for Multi-party 
Democracy [MMD] led by Frederick Chiluba. The 
MMD's political opportunity came in 1990, when 
mass civil unrest broke out after maize meal 
prices doubled. Urban rioters blamed the one- 
party system for the country's economic prob­
lems, and Kaunda was forced to allow for the 
legal recognition of other political parties. 
Disillusionment with UNIP was evident in the 
country's first multiparty elections the following 
year, as Chiluba and the MMD garnered more 
than 70 percent of the vote in almost all of the 
country's provinces, urban and rural alike 
[Bratton 1994],
Table 1: Zambia's Economic and Social Outcomes, 1965-2005
Indicator 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2 0 0 0 -0 5
GDP per capita (US$) 526.6 505.9 453.6 395.3 349.5 306.4 266.9 292.0
Share of GDP (%)
Agriculture 13.5 12.8 16.5 16.1 15.8 22.3 20.0 21.5
Manufacturing 9.0 13.4 18.8 21.0 29.3 29.8 12.6 11.6
Mining and construction 52.6 42.7 25.5 21.7 19.0 16.8 19.2 14.4
Exports 52.3 47.9 39.6 33.1 35.6 35.3 29.3 21.4
Investment — 29.7 26.0 16.1 8.8 11.6 13.5 21.9
Agriculture share of exports (%) 2.5 1.2 1.2 — — 4.9 10.3 16.4
Rural population share (%) 73.8 67.8 63.1 60.2 60.4 61.5 63.8 65.1
External debt per capita (US$) — 159.0 280.9 365.4 509.6 527.9 517.6 475.3
Copper price (US$1,000 per ton) 5.8 4.2 2.9 2.5 2.4 2.6 1.9 2.6
Exchange rate (US$ per kwacha) 0.7 0.7 0.7 1.1 8.5 277.9 1,527.3 4,182.7
Money supply growth rate (%) — 10.1 14.4 15.8 59.5 68.1 33.8 28.3
Annual inflation rate (%) 14.7 3.1 8.8 12.4 60.1 114.7 25.6 22.2
National poverty headcount (%) 
Rural households 
Urban households
1991
70.0
88.0 
49.0
1998
72.9
83.1
56.0
2004
68.0
78.0
53.0
Source: World Bank 2007; FAO 2007. 
Note: Dashes indicate "not available."
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Market-driven Development Strategy 
and Structural Adjustment, 1991 
Onward
Despite having been a vocal critic of SAPs, Chiluba 
adopted a market-driven strategy after winning the 
1991 elections [Larmer 2005], Given the dire eco­
nomic circumstances in the country and the 
MMD's campaign promises to restore economic 
growth, such reforms were essential if the MMD 
was to acquire legitimacy and distinguish its eco­
nomic policies from the previous UN1P govern­
ment. In addition to internal pressures for change, 
the shift to economic liberalization also mirrored a 
broader shift in the dominant development policy 
paradigm to the "Washington Consensus," which 
now emphasized the primacy of free markets and 
condemned government intervention.
The elimination of consumer subsidies on maize 
meal in 1991 was one of the first important reforms 
under the new MMD government. To maintain 
macroeconomic stability and fiscal austerity, the 
government could no longer afford to subsidize 
urban consumers. Although the loss of maize meal 
subsidies provoked the same level of protest wit­
nessed in 1986, the MMD government refused to 
capitulate [Simutanyi 1996], partly because a widen­
ing rift within the labor movement over economic 
policy reduced the unions' collective effort at 
organizing on behalf of their own interests. More­
over, given the origins of the MMD, the labor 
unions were effectively co-opted by the new ruling 
party, which thereby eliminated their autonomous 
influence over political decisionmaking [Pletcher 
2000; Simutanyi 1996], The rescinding of the maize 
meal subsidies contributed to a substantial decline 
in the budget deficit from 7.4 to 2.2 percent of 
GDP within the MMD's first year in office [Rakner 
et al. 2001],
At the macro-level, the new government adopted a 
high real interest rate, and the Bank of Zambia 
implemented a cash budget system to prevent the 
government from printing money to cover 
expenses [Rakner et al. 2001], These efforts helped 
reduce inflation from over 100 percent in 1991 to 
around 22 percent by 1998 [see Table 1], To further 
reduce public spending, the MMD established the 
Zambia Privatization Agency in 1993 to dismantle 
unprofitable state-owned businesses [McCulloch et 
al. 2000], The manufacturing sector proved the 
main target of this privatization effort, although
the copper mines were eventually privatized after 
2000. Without government support, manu­
facturers could no longer improve competitiveness 
behind tariff protection. As such, the rationale for 
ISI gradually disappeared, and Zambia lowered its 
import tariff rates from 100 percent to 25 percent 
over the course of the 1990s [Rakner et al. 2001]. 
The reversal of 1S1 provided a more conducive 
environment for agricultural exports, thereby 
helping correct terms-of-trade imbalances. Likewise, 
the correction of the overvalued exchange rate 
gradually reduced the price distortions against 
export agriculture, even though a more devalued 
currency made foreign imports more expensive for 
urban consumers [Thurlow and Wobst 2006],
Within the agricultural sector, NamBoard was dis­
mantled as a result of the termination of consumer 
food subsidies. Moreover, the government ended 
its bias toward maize production by terminating 
panterritorial pricing and uneven input support for 
maize. Nevertheless, the government could not 
afford to invest scarce resources in the infra­
structure necessary for farmers to transport their 
output and purchase inputs. In fact, as of 1998, 
only 18 percent of rural households lived within five 
kilometers of input markets [Thurlow and Wobst 
2006],
By the end of the 1990s, the structural adjustment 
program had at least three major effects on social 
welfare outcomes. First, urban dwellers experienced 
a severe contraction in purchasing power and jobs. 
Privatization and the end of ISI required manu­
facturing companies to either close down or 
decrease production costs by reducing the size of 
the labor force. As such, between 1991 and 1998 
more than 32,000 employees in the formal manu­
facturing sector lost their jobs [McCulloch et al. 
2000], Moreover, the collapse in copper prices 
caused more than 25,000 workers in the mining 
sector to lose their jobs over the decade 
[McCulloch et al. 2000], The cumulative impact of 
the loss of jobs and consumer subsidies resulted in 
an approximately 6 percent increase in urban 
poverty between 1991 and 1998 [Table I], This shift 
led to a dramatic reversal of earlier migration 
patterns, with Zambians now moving from urban to 
rural areas [Potts 2005].
Second, the agricultural sector experienced 
increased diversification and disparities. On the one 
hand, liberalization encouraged a number of foreign 
private companies to establish outgrower schemes
for cotton and horticultural products. Outgrower 
schemes are a form of agribusiness that provides 
farmers with the necessary inputs and training for 
the production of high-quality goods in exchange 
for a guaranteed portion of the farmer's agricul­
tural output. Taking advantage of Zambia's more 
open trade environment, most of these goods were 
geared toward export markets. Farmers involved in 
these industries require close proximity to estab­
lished transport infrastructure, and therefore pro­
duction of these crops occurs mainly in the east of 
the country. The share of agriculture in exports 
rose from 5 percent in 1990 to 16 percent a decade 
later [Table 1].
On the other hand, there were mixed effects in the 
food crop sector. A number of farmers began 
producing crops better suited to their agroeco- 
Iogical zones. For instance, the area of land devoted 
to maize fell by 23 percent between 1990 and 1997 
[McCulloch et al. 2000], while cassava production 
expanded in the north of the country and 
producers in the south switched to sorghum and 
millet [Haggblade and Zulu 2003], Yet constraints 
on public spending ensured that more remote food 
crop producers rarely possessed adequate credit to 
purchase high-yielding seeds and fertilizer. Unlike 
high-value export crop production, food staples 
production failed to attract much private invest­
ment and support [Saasa 2003). As a result, rural 
areas experienced a slight decrease in poverty over 
the 1990s (see Table 1), but a majority of this 
reduction occurred among smallholders involved in 
cotton and horticulture. For instance, some of the 
largest poverty declines occurred in the Eastern 
Province where outgrower cotton schemes are 
concentrated.
Third, the expansion of agriculture and the slight 
reduction in rural poverty were accompanied by 
the stabilization of certain malnutrition indicators. 
Having risen rapidly since independence, the pro­
portion of Zambians who were undernourished 
remained constant at 47 percent throughout the 
1990s. Malnutrition did not decline during the 
structural adjustment period, but it did not worsen 
either.
Despite the hardships incurred during the struc­
tural adjustment of the 1990s, the MMD's more 
prudent macroeconomic policies now appear to 
have laid the foundations for renewed growth. Per 
capita GDP since 2000  has risen for the first time 
since independence, and poverty fell in both rural 
and urban areas between 1998 and 2004 (see Table
1). Agriculture's share of GDP has expanded, albeit 
as a result of a sluggish manufacturing sector, and 
export diversification has continued, with agricul­
ture becoming an important source of export 
revenues and foreign exchange. Finally, the 
macroeconomic stability and development out­
comes achieved since 1991 helped Zambia qualify for 
substantial debt relief under the World Bank/IMF 
Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC). 
Thus, the past five decades of development in 
Zambia demonstrate the need for consistency 
between macroeconomic and sectoral policies in a 
country's strategy and the importance of stake­
holder interests in influencing policy choices.
Stakeholders
The interests and roles of key stakeholders changed 
dramatically between the period of UNIP rule and 
the ascendancy of the MMD after 1991. As seen in 
Table 2, in the pre-1991 period, smallholder farmers 
desired a market value for their agricultural 
production and improved rural infrastructure. Yet 
these preferences were difficult for the UNIP 
government to satisfy given the party's concern 
with maintaining the support of urban constituents, 
who were more interested in low food prices and 
greater employment opportunities in the cities. At 
the same time, UNIP faced pressure from the 
World Bank and IMF to embark on market-driven 
reforms under a structural adjustment program. 
Ultimately, UNI P's credibility with all of these 
other stakeholders collapsed, benefitting the MMD 
in the country's first multiparty elections.
In the post-1991 period, the MMD adopted many of 
the policy prescriptions for market reform advo­
cated by international donors, and the country 
benefitted from debt relief under the HIPC. These 
reforms removed input subsidies for farmers and 
thereby increased the desire of this stakeholder 
group for seed and fertilizer credit. For urbanites 
and the Zambian Confederation of Trade Unions 
(ZCTU), which were previously the support base 
for the MMD, employment and inflation remained 
major concerns. Indeed, the decline in living 
standards of urban constituents during most of the 
1990s under the MMD's market-driven policies has 
led to a rise in opposition parties, such as Michael 
Sata's Patriotic Front (PF), which increasingly appeal 
to the urban poor. Thus, after enjoying more than 
a decade of relatively unchallenged rule, the MMD 
is for the first time forced to deal with a credible 
opposition party.
Tabic 2: Stakeholder Interests in Z am bia's Reform Process
Interests/roles
Stakeholders Pre-1991 Post-1991
Smallholder farmers and 
commercial agriculture
Rural infrastructure, removal of 
food price controls
Rural infrastructure, export 
competitiveness, seed and fertilizer 
credit
Urban consumers and the 
Zambian Confederation of Trade 
Unions (ZCTU)
Low food prices, low inflation, more 
public sector and industrial jobs, 
multiparty democracy
Low inflation, more jobs, increased 
support for urban-based political 
parties opposing the MMD
United National Independence 
Party (UNIP]
State-directed industrialization, 
mining revenues, maintenance of 
urban electoral support, one-party 
democracy
Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD)
Low food prices, low inflation, 
multiparty democracy
Market-driven development
World Bank and IMF Structural adjustment Continued market reforms, debt 
relief
Policy Options
Zambia's shifting political circumstances have been 
further complicated by a rise in world copper 
prices, which began to climb again in 2004 (see 
Figure 2], Although this price rise provides new 
opportunities, it could also challenge Zambia's 
market-driven development strategy (Breisinger and 
Thurlow 2008). As noted earlier, most state-owned 
enterprises were privatized during the 1990s. 
Despite initial reluctance, the government sold its 
mining assets to a foreign firm soon after 2000. 
This sale took place at a time when copper prices 
were low and the inefficient copper mines were 
hemorrhaging US$1 million a day (McCulloch et al.
2000) . The government was therefore forced to 
offer tax incentives to foreign companies in order 
to secure the sale and reduce its fiscal deficit (Craig
2001) . Negotiated tax rates were set at less than 1 
percent of the revenues earned by the copper 
mines. Thus, although copper prices and profits 
have risen rapidly since 2004, their effect on 
government revenues remains small.
At the same time, however, the effect of rising 
copper prices on Zambia's exchange rate has been 
pronounced. The real exchange rate appreciated by 
25 percent during 2005 alone (World Bank 2007). 
This rise has undermined the competitiveness of 
agricultural exports and reduced the profits of 
commercial agriculture. Falling prices were passed 
on to those smallholder farmers who had benefited 
from the rise of agricultural exports during the 
1990s (Fynn and Haggblade 2006). Conversely, 
food crop farmers with good access to input 
markets have benefited from lower prices for 
imported fertilizer. These benefits, however, are 
offset by lower prices for imported foods, which 
hurt farmers closer to and more dependent on 
urban markets. In fact, urban consumers are the 
likely beneficiaries from the appreciation because 
they have a stronger preference for, and better 
access to, foreign imports.
Figure 2: Global Commodity Prices, 1970-2006
Source: World Bank 2007, cited in Breisinger and Thurlow 2008.
Note: Dollar-denominated commodity prices deflated by U.S. producer price index.
Given these present circumstances, Zambia now 
faces a difficult policy choice: should the govern­
ment raise mining taxes and use these revenues to 
invest in growth? On the one hand, higher copper 
prices and an appreciating exchange rate could lead 
to the kind of Dutch disease experienced during 
the 1960s and 1970s, thus undermining Zambia's 
recent successes in export growth and diversifica­
tion. Back in the 1960s, the government argued 
that such losses would be temporary if mining 
revenues were used to promote industrialization. 
Now, however, the copper mines are owned by 
private companies whose tax rates are low, and thus 
current copper revenues are not sufficient to 
finance large-scale interventionist sectoral policies.
Raising taxes on foreign mining companies offers a 
number of advantages. Although tax breaks were 
needed when copper prices were low, copper prices 
are now at a historic high and mining companies no 
longer need preferential treatment. Furthermore, 
the country's exchange rate is already appreciating 
and undermining agricultural exports, which had 
driven poverty reduction during the 1990s. With­
out additional revenues, the government's ability to 
respond to this appreciation remains limited. If 
taxes were increased, the government could use the 
additional revenue to invest in raising the produc­
tivity of agriculture and industry. If effective, this 
step should benefit workers in the food and manu­
facturing sectors, whose jobs and livelihoods are
being threatened by eroded export competitiveness 
and cheaper imports.
Increasing mining taxes also has disadvantages, 
however. When private mining companies remit 
their profits, they are in effect relieving some of 
the pressure on the kwacha by increasing the 
demand for foreign currency. If the government 
increases mining taxes, then more of the copper 
revenues remain inside the country, thus increasing 
the demand for kwacha and exacerbating the 
appreciation. The government therefore finds itself 
in a difficult situation: if it raises mining taxes to 
respond to the appreciation but is unable to 
properly invest in non-mining sectors, then it risks 
making the appreciation and its negative conse­
quences even worse. So, given Zambia's poor track 
record in turning mining revenues into productive 
investments, it may be better to leave mining taxes 
unchanged. This approach would not address the 
adverse effects of the current appreciation, but it 
would minimize the risk of an unsuccessful invest­
ment strategy that further undermines agricultural 
exports and rural incomes.
The choice of whether to use mining revenues to 
finance economic development suggests that the 
political economy of Zambia has in some ways 
come full circle. After independence, the country 
adopted a state-directed industrialization strategy 
financed by copper revenues. Then when copper
prices collapsed, the resulting macroeconomic crisis 
forced a departure from an interventionist 
approach and a transition to democracy. The new 
government adopted a market-oriented strategy, 
which required more restrained macroeconomic 
policies. The government was forced to limit its 
sectoral policies with some positive consequences 
for agriculture and negative ones for the urban 
sector. Today's government is now struggling to 
retain its urban base against rising opposition 
parties targeting the urban poor. This situation may 
prove enough of an incentive for the government 
to raise mining taxes and again use these revenues 
to finance urban-biased policies.
Assignment
Given the current political environment and taking 
into account the mechanisms through which a 
change in world copper prices affects the agricul­
tural sector, your assignment is to advise Zambia's 
government on how to use the revenues gained 
from increasing mining taxes to improve economic 
growth and reduce poverty.
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